Mortgages -- Tenancy in Common -- Rights to Improvements by Adams, J. G., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 8 | Number 4 Article 21
6-1-1930
Mortgages -- Tenancy in Common -- Rights to
Improvements
J. G. Adams Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. G. Adams Jr., Mortgages -- Tenancy in Common -- Rights to Improvements, 8 N.C. L. Rev. 469 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol8/iss4/21
NOTES AND COMMENTS
statutory requirement that awards are to be made for actual loss
suffered.1 0
T. J. GoLD, JR.
Mortgages-Tenancy in Common-Right to Improvements
In the case of Layton v. Byrd1 the defendant had purchased a
tract of land from three tenants in common, A, B, and C. The interests
of B and C were unencumbered, that of A was subject to a mort-
gage to T, unknown to the defendant. Defendant before foreclosure
by T, and after purchase from A, B, and C, made permanent im-
provements on the land. Plaintiff sub'sequently purchased the one-
third undivided interest formerly owned by A at foreclosure sale
by T. In a bill for partition by plaintiff, Held, The rule entitling
the tenant in common to the value of his improvements on partition 2
is inapplicable, the rule that improvements made on mortgaged lands
by the mortgagor or one claiming under him inure to the benefit of
the mortgagee3 must be applied, and the plaintiff is entitled to a pro-
portionate part of the improvements.
The court reaches its conclusion on the reasoning that, at the time
the improvements were put upon the land, there was no tenancy in
common in existence, but the land was held by Byrd, defendant, as
sole owner. Consequently, since there was no co-tenant against
whom he could assert his equity the tenant in common rule cannot
0 Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 23 L. ed. 374 (1875) ;
WMLISTON ON CONTRACTS (1920) §1338. Several cases have recognized the
anomalous but equitable doctrine tthat occasionally the measure of damages
cannot be determined by reference to either the wholesale or retail price. See
Clark v. Parsons, 109 Mo. App. 432, 84 S. W. 1019 (1905). Thus in the United
States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 43 Sup. Ct. 565, 67 L. ed.
1014 (1923) it was held that where coal was appropriated by the government,
and where there was a free market for export coal, and the coal could have
been sold in such market, the owner was entitled to the export price, although
this was higher than domestic rates.
1198 N. C. 466, 152 S. E. 161 (1930).
'If one tenant in common makes improvements on the common property
he will be entitled upon partition to the value of his share in the land in its
unimproved condition and the value of the improvements, if this can be done
without prejudice to his co-tenants. Pope v. Whitehead, 68 N. C. 191 (1873) ;
Collett v. Henderson, 80 N. C. 337 (1879) ; Fisher v. Toxaway Co., 171 N. C.
547, 88 S. E. 887 (1916) ; see Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1189; Bayley v. Nichols,
263 Ill. 116, 104 N. E. 1054 (1914); Crafts v. Crafts, 13 Gray 360 (Mass.
1859); Fenton x.. Miller, 116 Mich. 45, 72 Am. St. Rep. 502, 74 N. W. 384
(1898).
' Wharton v. Moore, 84 N. C. 479 (1881); Belvin v. Raleigh Paper Co.,
123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655 (1898) ; see also Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 601.
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be applied. The mortgage was a conveyance of the legal title to the
mortgagor's interest to T as security for the debt; the mortgagor to
all other purposes remained owner, and continued so until his con-
veyance to Byrd. By operation of the mortgage rule the lien of the
mortgage extends over one-third of the improvements.
A mortgage can convey no more to the mortgagee than an abso-
lute conveyance can convey to the grantee. If A had deeded his in-
terest in the land to T, the mortgagee, instead of making the mort-
gage, neither T nor his vendee could have obtained an interest in the
improvements, by application of the tenant in common rule. Does
it not follow, a fortiori, that T cannot obtain a benefit from the
mortgage which he could not have-obtained had he become absolute
owner of the A interest? It is interesting, as well, to note that Byrd,
by his purchase from A, B, and C was placed in a worse position
than had he merely purchased the interests of B and C. Clearly, had
A remained owner of his equity Byrd would have had a co-tenant
against whom the tenant in common rule could be applied, and an
indisputable claim to the whole of the improvements. In the instant
case he lost the A interest by foreclosure, together with one-third the
value of the improvements. It cannot be said that he was compen-
sated by way of an increase in the value of the equity of redemption 4
in the A interest-the plaintiff bought without knowledge of the
improvements, and there was no surplus of purchase money to go to
Byrd.
If the improver himself had mortgaged the one-third undivided
interest, or had he assumed payment of the mortgage, other con-
siderations than those present in the principal case might well justify
the court in holding as it did. However, the natural justice of the
situation seems heavily on the side of. the dhfendant-not only did
the plaintiff, to the extent of his knowledge, buy and pay for the A
interest in its unimproved condition, but, as well, Byrd made his
improvements in good faith without any actual notice of the exist-
ence of the mortgage. The cases cited in the opinion in support of
the mortgage rule5 refer without exception to situations where the
'It has been argued in support of the mortgage rule that it not only adds
to the value of the mortgagee's security, but also it increases the value of the
mortgagor's equity, Butler v. Page, 7 Metc. 40 (Mass. 1843).
"Martin v. Beatty, 54 Ill. 100 (1870); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hunt-
ington, 57 Kan. 744, 48 S. W. 19 (1897) ; Rice v. Dewy, 54 Barb. 455 (N. Y.
1862) ; Gibson v. American Loan and Trust Co., 58 Hun. 443, 12 N. Y. S. 444
(1890) ; Childs v. Dolan, 5 Allen 319 (Mass. 1862) ; Ivey v. Yancey, 129 Mo.
501, 31 S. W. 937 (1895).
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mortgage wholly covers the mortgaged land, as distinguished from a
mortgage of an undivided interest. The only case in point,6 not
cited by court or counsel in the Layton case, reaches a contrary re-
sult, applying the tenant in common rule denying the mortgagee's
assignees the right to share in the improvements, and logic at least
seems to support that holding. If A, the mortgagor, had retained
his equitable title, as co-tenant he could not have shared in the im-
provements on partition, nor could T as mortgagee claiming under
him.7 Should the fact that the improver has purchased the interest
of A increase the rights of the mortgagee? Could it not be strongly
argued that there was a tenancy in common at the time the improve-
ments were made? Since undeniably T was a legal tenant in com-
mon by virtue of his holding legal title, it seems that the tenant in
common rule could be applied as against T.
J. G. ADAMS, JR.
Municipal Corporations-County Bonds-Effect of Thirty Day
Limitation on Validity of Bond. Ordinance
The County Finance Act of North Carolina provides, among
other things, that "... no order shall be passed (by any county)
for the issuance of bonds other than school bonds unless it appears
from said sworn statement (order) that the net indebtedness for
other than school purposes does not exceed five per cent of said
assessed valuation (of the county). . . ."1 It further prov'ides, that
the validity of a bond order shall not "be open to question in any
court upon any ground whatsoever," unless the proceeding shall be
commenced "within thirty days after the first publication of notice"
of the bond order.2 In Kirby v. Board of Commissioners of Person
County,3 a bond ordinance was adopted by the board of commission-
ers authorizing the issuance of bonds for court house and jail pur-
poses. The amount of this bond order raised the total indebtedness
of Person County above five per cent of its assessed valuation. Some
ninety days after notice of the bond order had been published, the
' The defendant purchased all the shares of several co-tenants in land and
erected improvements believing himself to be sole owner. The plaintiffs,
assignees of the holder of a prior mortgage on the share of one co-tenant, sue
to foreclose. Annely v. DeSaussure, 17 S: C. 394 (1881).
'Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 621; Annely v. DeSaussure, supra note 6.
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (17).
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (20).
3Y98 N. C. 440, 152 S. E. 165 (1930).
